Maximal Extractable Value (MEV)
Maximal extractable value (MEV) is the extra profit that can be made from producing a block, beyond the standard block reward and gas fees, by including, excluding or reordering the transactions it contains.
On public blockchains such as Ethereum, pending transactions usually wait in a public mempool where anyone can see them. Whoever decides a block's contents can choose which transactions go in and in what order. Automated bots called searchers often pay for that placement. The term was originally "miner extractable value" but was renamed after Ethereum moved to proof of stake, because validators and block builders, not miners, now order transactions.
Not all MEV harms users. Arbitrage that brings prices on different exchanges back into line, and liquidations that keep lending protocols solvent, are common and largely benign forms. The harmful kinds target ordinary traders. In a sandwich attack, a bot spots a large pending swap on a decentralized exchange and buys the same token just before it. The victim's trade then pushes the price up, and the bot sells straight after. The victim receives fewer tokens, up to the limit of their slippage tolerance, and the bot keeps the difference.
MEV can be a significant source of revenue for validators. It can also raise transaction fees, add to network congestion and make execution less fair for regular users. A common misconception is that MEV can be eliminated entirely. On transparent public blockchains it can only be reduced. Sending transactions through private relays that bypass the public mempool, and keeping slippage tolerance no higher than needed, both lower exposure.